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NOTE
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE CABLE
TELEVISION INDUSTRY: REIGNING IN A
GIANT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
On October 5, 1992, Congress overrode a presidential veto, passing the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the
"1992 Cable Act" or the "Act"),' designed to re-regulate the cable televi-
sion industry.' In response to congressional findings,3 lawmakers
designed the Act to correct market imbalances within the video industry,
1. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) [hereinafter The 1992 Cable Act or the Act].
2. Id. §§ 2-3 (setting forth the findings for establishing the Act, the policy behind the
Act, and the actual regulation of rates established by the Act); Helen Dewar & Kenneth J.
Cooper, Congress Overrides Cable TV Bill Veto, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1992, at Al; Mary
Lu Carnevale, Bush's Veto of Cable-TV Bill is Overturned, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1992, at
A3. President Bush's veto was overturned and the bill was approved by a vote of 74-25 in
the Senate and 308-114 in the House. Id. Thus, Congress eclipsed the two-thirds majority
required by the United States Constitution. See id.; U.S. CONT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring
a two-thirds majority vote by each house of Congress to override a Presidential veto).
Congress enacted the legislation after conducting extensive hearings on the cable televi-
sion industry accompanied by intense lobbying by many special interest groups. S. REP.
No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1991). The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation held eleven hearings on cable television between 1989 and 1991. Id.
The committee reviewed legislation that had been introduced in the 101st and 102nd Con-
gresses, including S. 12, which was amended into the 1992 Cable Act. Id. Most signifi-
cantly, the committee held three hearings in June of 1989 on competition in the video
programming industry. Id. at 3. It held a hearing on October 18, 1989, to discuss the
carriage of local broadcast stations and to review the 1984 Cable Act. Id. In 1991, the
committee held a hearing specifically addressing S. 12. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 26-27 (1992). The House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance held three days of hearings on H.R. 1303 on March 20,
1991, and June 18th and 27th of the same year. Id. at 74. H.R. 1303 was the predecessor
legislation to H.R. 4850, which was amended with S. 12 to become the 1992 Cable Act. Id.;
see also infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (detailing the groups lobbying for and
against The 1992 Cable Act).
3. The findings of Congress are recounted in the Act itself. See The 1992 Cable Act
§§ 2(a)(1)-(21). Generally, Congress determined that cable rates had increased dramati-
cally and that the cable industry grew at the expense of the broadcast industry. Id.
§ 2(a)(1); see also infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (outlining in detail the specific
findings of Congress as stated in the Act).
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promote competition within both the cable industry and the entire video
industry, and assure the survival of free, local television broadcasting.4
The Act included must-carry regulations requiring cable systems to trans-
mit broadcast stations requesting carriage, which generated enormous
controversy. 5
The Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") first promul-
gated must-carry regulations in a limited form in 1965.6 The following
year, the FCC extended the regulations to cover all cable systems.7 Must-
carry regulations have been expanded in subsequent years, purportedly
to protect the economic survival of local broadcast stations.8
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia invalidated the FCC's must-carry rules under
the First Amendment.1" Applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the
4. The 1992 Cable Act §§ 2(a)-(b). See also H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (1992) (providing a detailed account of the committee members' motives for passing
H.R. 4850). Specifically, the House recognized that the legislation would protect consum-
ers by promoting competition in the video industry. Id. at 26. The House recognized that
regulatory measures were necessary to foster competition. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 92,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1991) (providing a detailed account of the committee members'
purpose for passing S. 12). Specifically, the Senate recognized that serious problems, such
as excessive rate increases, had accompanied the growth of the cable industry since deregu-
lation in 1984. Id. at 2-3. The Senate stated that its purpose for the legislation was "to
promote competition in the multichannel video marketplace and to provide protection for
consumers against monopoly rates and poor customer service." Id. at 1. During floor
debate, Senator Daniel Inouye, an original sponsor of the Act, stated that: "The purpose
of this legislation is very simple and straightforward: to promote competition in the video
industry and to protect consumers from excessive rates and poor customer service where
no competition exists." 138 CONG. REC. S14,222 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Inouye).
5. The 1992 Cable Act §§ 4-5; see also infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text
(providing a detailed description of the specific must-carry regulations of the 1992 Cable
Act).
6. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-15 (1965) (discussing the
need for imposing carriage and nonduplication rules with the proliferation of community
antennae television systems (CATV)).
7. CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 745 (1966) (concluding that the must-carry rules should
apply to all cable systems because the public interest of promoting fair competition applies
equally to microwave and non-microwave CATV systems).
8. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 164 n.32 (1972) (noting that
the 1972 rules were adopted to encourage the growth of cable while "preserving a healthy
broadcast service").
9. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
10. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1454. The court noted that it need not decide what standard of
First Amendment review was applicable to analyze must-carry regulations because the
rules failed the lower intermediate level of scrutiny analysis as articulated in United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Id. At the outset, the court noted that the government
did not carry its burden because the "substantial governmental interest" was stated in the
abstract. Id. The court held that the government must do more than allege a problem. Id.
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Quincy court determined that the rules were overly broad.'" The court
noted, however, that the must-carry rules were not per se12 unconstitu-
tional and invited the FCC to redraft the rules.' 3 Approximately one
year after the FCC conformed the rules to be consistent with the Quincy
decision, the same court in Century Communications Corp. v. FCC'4 set
aside the must-carry regulations as still inconsistent with the First
Amendment. 15 The court re-emphasized that must-carry regulations
were not per se unconstitutional and, if drafted properly, would pass con-
stitutional muster' 6
The 1992 Cable Act included must-carry provisions similar to those
previously declared unconstitutional in Century Communications.17
at 1455. Furthermore, the court noted that the FCC had not proven the underlying as-
sumptions for the must-carry regulations. Id. at 1457. The court stated that:
[T]he FCC has failed to "put itself in a position to know" whether the problem
the rule seeks to cure - the destruction of free, local television - "is a real or
merely a fanciful threat." That approach, we have concluded, falls far short of the
burden the government must affirmatively bear to prove the substantiality of the
interest served by the rules.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).
11. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1460-61. The court concluded that the rules were overinclu-
sive because they protected all broadcasters regardless of whether they were adversely
affected by a cable system. Id.; see infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing
Quincy in detail and concluding that the must-carry rules as written were overly broad and
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
12. Per se is defined as "by itself; in itself.., in its own nature without reference to its
relation." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1463. Specifically, the court invited the FCC to redraft the
rules consistent with the opinion, and stated that the court would reconsider the must-carry
rules if the FCC did so. Id.
14. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
15. Id. at 304 (affirming the unconstitutionality of the must-carry rules under the
O'Brien standard without determining if the strict level of scrutiny was appropriate); see
infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the court's decision in Cen-
tury Communications which concluded that the must-carry rules were unconstitutional
under the intermediate scrutiny standard).
16. Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 304. As previously noted in Quincy, the
court stated that the must-carry regulations were not per se unconstitutional, but that this
particular draft of the rules was unconstitutional. Id. In discussing the government's bur-
den of proving empirical support or sound reasoning for its position, the court noted:
"[W]e reluctantly conclude that the FCC has not done so in this case.... Accordingly, we
have no choice but to strike down this latest embodiment of must-carry." Id. at 304-05
(emphasis added).
17. Gary S. Lutzker, The 1992 Cable Act and the First Amendment: What Must, Must
Not, and May Be Carried, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467, 488 (1994) (noting that the
must-carry regulations imposed by the 1992 Cable Act "bear a striking resemblance" to
those previously declared unconstitutional in Century Communications). Cable operators,
programmers, and suppliers argue that these must-carry regulations are more restrictive
and less narrowly tailored than the previous regulations. Id. at 488 n.136.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:615
Upon enactment of the Cable Act, several cable operators filed suits
challenging the constitutionality of specific provisions of the Act, includ-
ing the must-carry provisions. 18
In Turner Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,9 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia upheld the must-carry provisions in sections
four and five of the Cable Act.20 The Turner Broadcasting court held that
must-carry regulations are consistent with the First Amendment under
the intermediate scrutiny test developed in United States v. O'Brien,21
18. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.) (upholding the
must-carry provisions as consistent with the First Amendment), vacated and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 2445 (1993), vacated and remanded sub nom. National Interfaith Cable Coalition v.
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2730 (1994). Four other plaintiff groups brought similar suits challenging
the must-carry provisions. Id. at 37 n.8 (citing cases in which plaintiffs challenged § 4, 5,
and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act). Section 6, the retransmission consent provision of the 1992
Cable Act, prohibits cable operators from retransmitting the signals of any commercial
broadcasting station without first securing the station's consent. The 1992 Cable Act § 6.
In conjunction with § 4, § 6 provides local broadcasters with an option to elect either
mandatory carriage on a cable system or to negotiate under the retransmission consent
provision. Id. Prior to the 1992 Cable Act, cable operators "were free to carry the signals
of local broadcasters subject only to the 'compulsory license' provisions of the copyright
law." Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 37 n.6; see 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1994) (providing
an exception to broadcasters' exclusive copyrights on broadcast programming to the cable
industry). Under § 4 and § 6, "operators may transmit broadcast signals if they pay royalty
fees determined pursuant to an administrative schedule." Turner Broadcasting, 819 F.
Supp. at 37 n.6. On November 23, 1992, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia consolidated the cases challenging the must-carry provisions and retransmission
consent provisions to determine the provisions' constitutionality. Id. at 37. On December
15, 1992, the same court declined to exercise jurisdiction over any claims besides the must-
carry claims. Id. at 37-38 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308
(D.D.C. 1992) (three-judge panel)). The plaintiffs argued that §§ 4, 5, and 6 were not sev-
erable. Turner Broadcasting, 810 F. Supp. at 1315. Because the court held § 4 and § 5
constitutional, the plaintiffs could not challenge § 6. Id.
19. 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1993), vacated
and remanded sub nom. National Interfaith Cable Coalition v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2730 (1994).
20. Id. at 57. The Act specified in § 23 a mechanism for judicial review by a three-
judge panel of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Id. at 37. The statute states
that "any civil action challenging the constitutionality of ... any provision [of this Act] ...
shall be heard by a district court of three judges convened pursuant to the provisions of
section 2284 of title 28, United States Code." The 1992 Cable Act § 23(c)(1).
The court deferred to congressional findings in holding the must-carry regulations con-
stitutional. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 39-40. The court recognized that Con-
gress had the power to regulate the industry pursuant to its economic regulatory powers.
Id. at 40. The court concluded that Congress was attempting to regulate the medium, and
not the content of the messages being conveyed. Id.
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Specifically the O'Brien Court stated that a government regu-
lation is justified if:
[The regulation] is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
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and further defined in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 2 The district court
reasoned that the regulations furthered a "significant government inter-
est" in the survival of local broadcasting by promoting fair competition
within the video industry.2 3 The court also found that the must-carry pro-
visions were "sufficiently . . . tailored" to achieve Congress' objective,
even though less restrictive means may be available.2 4 Therefore, the
regulations did not unnecessarily burden a substantial amount of the
plaintiffs' speech.2 5  Turner Broadcasting appealed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the must-carry provisions
violated the First Amendment. 6 Significantly, the Court determined the
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
22. 491 U.S. 781 (1989); see Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 45 (holding that the
intermediate level of scrutiny test established by O'Brien and Rock Against Racism should
be applied to determine whether the must-carry regulations are constitutional under the
First Amendment).
The standard of intermediate scrutiny was first articulated by the Court in Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see CRAIG R. DUCAT & HAROLD W. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 633 (4th ed. 1988). In Craig, a majority of the Court agreed that a "mid-
dle-tier" or "intermediate scrutiny" Snalysis applied to regulations based on gender. Id.
Under this analysis, the regulations "'must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' " Id. This test has
been employed in other areas of constitutional adjudication, such as in cases where regula-
tions are based on illegitimacy and alienage. Id. at 634. This standard should be compared
with the concept of strict scrutiny first articulated by Justice Stone in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
The rights of speech, press, association, assembly, and other liberties essential to the
democratic process are "preferred freedoms." DUCAT & CHASE, supra at 67. If legislation
abridges a "preferred freedom," the legislation is presumed unconstitutional under a strict
scrutiny analysis. Id. at 68. The government must then satisfy a two-prong test where the
regulation must advance a compelling interest and the policy adopted by the government
advancing this interest must be the least restrictive means available. Id. Furthermore, the
test of strict scrutiny has also been applied to review legislation targeting "suspect classifi-
cations" such as race-based regulations. Id. at 69.
23. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 45.
24. Id. at 47.
25. The court concluded that:
The 1992 Cable Act represents a major congressional effort to bring order and
stability to an industry that significantly, and often profoundly, touches American
lives .... Simply put, the governmental intention evinced by the must-carry pro-
visions is economic, not ideologic, and raises no suspicion of the type of ominous
government interference with speech against which the First Amendment
protects.
Id. at 47-48.
26. Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994). The Court
noted that "because not every interference with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny
under the First Amendment, we must decide at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable
to the must-carry provisions." Id.
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appropriate standard of review for the must-carry regulations under the
First Amendment.27
The Court defined the must-carry regulations in the 1992 Cable Act as
content-neutral rules that impose an incidental restriction on speech.28
The rules, accordingly, were subject to intermediate scrutiny under the
First Amendment, similar to the analysis used for reviewing "time, place
and manner" restrictions.29
The dissent in Turner Broadcasting disagreed, finding that the must-
carry regulations imposed by the 1992 Cable Act were content-based reg-
ulations.3" The dissent, therefore, subjected the rules to the strict scrutiny
analysis,3 ' and concluded that the must-carry regulations did not survive
the strict scrutiny test.32 Even assuming that the regulations were con-
tent-neutral, therefore applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the dis-
sent found that the must-carry regulations were unconstitutional.33
This Note analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Tur-
ner Broadcasting on fundamental principles of First Amendment juris-
prudence. Initially, this Note distinguishes between content-neutral and
content-specific governmental regulations, and examines the levels of
First Amendment protection afforded to each. Next, this Note analyzes
the levels of First Amendment protection provided to the media and the
justifications for these different standards. Scrutinizing regulation of
cable television in general, and the must-carry regulations in particular,
this Note supplies a basis for analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in
27. Id. at 2469.
28. Id. at 2462.
29. Id. at 2469. The Court has never held that speech is completely free from govern-
mental regulation. GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ET AL., "CABLESPEECH": THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECrION 25 (1983). Thus, the government may regulate the "time, place,
and manner" of the speech to maintain order in public places. Id.; see Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (provid-
ing that the test applicable to such regulations is that the regulation must be "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech ... serve a significant governmen-
tal interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information").
30. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). The dissent argued that the must-carry provisions were content-based,
stating that "I cannot avoid the conclusion that its preference for broadcasters over cable
programmers is justified with reference to content." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the
dissent reasoned that Congress' findings demonstrated a content-based justification. Id.
For example, Congress found that the Act furthered substantial governmental interests in
promoting a diversity of views, and in providing educational programming. Id.
31. Id. at 2478. The dissent noted that content-based restrictions, even if benignly
motivated, cannot escape the strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 2477.
32. Id. at 2478-79. Specifically, the dissent argued that the regulations were overly
broad under both the strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny analyses. Id. at 2479-80.
33. Id.
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Turner Broadcasting. Next, this Note examines the Supreme Court's de-
cision regarding the must-carry rules and concludes that these regulations
are content-neutral regulations promulgated primarily for economic rea-
sons. Finally, this Note argues that because the economic health of the
broadcasting industry is not in jeopardy, the economic premise on which
the must-carry regulations are based is invalid.
I. THE BASIS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment forbids Congress from passing laws that regulate
speech or the press.34 A recurrent problem in modern First Amendment
jurisprudence is whether the First Amendment provides absolute protec-
tion for speech, or merely requires a balancing of the competing inter-
ests.3  To determine the specific level of First Amendment protection
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Specifically, "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
35. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004 (12th ed. 1991). Justice Black
advocated an absolutist position, stating that "I believe that the First Amendment's une-
quivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and as-
sembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to
be done." Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Contrast this position with Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Konigsberg, which
advocated a balancing approach:
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... are "absolutes"
... general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of
law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass,
when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental inter-
ests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing
of the governmental interest involved.
Id. at 49-51 (citations omitted). Other proponents of the balancing approach included Jus-
tice Frankfurter and Justice Powell. GUNTHER, supra at 1004.
Another popular approach to First Amendment adjudication is the categorization ap-
proach, which the Court uses to find fighting words and obscenity speech unprotected by
the First Amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(holding "fighting" words are not protected by First Amendment); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscenity not protected by First Amendment); Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952) (holding libelous utterances directed at a defined
group not protected by the First Amendment); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 29 at 20-23
(explaining the categorical approach taken by the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire). This approach excludes from First Amendment protection speech which is
"lewd and obscene, profane, and libelous" and "fighting words," due to their slight social
value, and words that "present a clear and present danger" under Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919). Id.; but see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (affording First Amendment protection to defamation of a public servant acting in
official capacity unless "actual malice" is established); Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (refusing to extend the New York Times standard of "actual malice" to
media defamation of private individuals, but allowing states to define the appropriate stan-
dard of liability); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (limiting the obscenity
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from governmental interference, courts increasingly distinguish regula-
tions that are content-based from those that are content-neutral.36
A. Content-Specific vs. Content-Neutral Regulations and the Applicable
First Amendment Standards
The First Amendment prevents the government from restricting speech
or expressive conduct based on the ideas expressed.37  Nevertheless,
within certain narrowly defined categories of speech, courts have allowed
exception). For the view that the balancing controversy is misleading and unnecessary, see
Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L.
REV. 428, 441-44 (1967) (arguing that the Court utilizes a balancing approach to the First
Amendment only when examining a regulation that incidentally affects speech); see also
SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 21-24 (providing the balancing test used to analyze a First
Amendment problem). Courts currently employ a two-step analysis under the First
Amendment. Id. at 23. First, courts must assess the impact of the regulation to determine
if, and to what extent, the regulation infringes upon speech. Id. Next, the court balances
the speaker's First Amendment interest against the asserted governmental interest. Id. at
24. Under this test, the government bears the burden of proving the existence of its as-
serted interest. Id.
36. GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 1211 (stating that the Court scrutinizes content-based
regulations more carefully than content-neutral regulations). One scholar notes that a
First Amendment analysis begins with the idea that "communication is presumptively pro-
tected from government interference." SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 20. Therefore, as a
consequence, the government must remain neutral when it regulates speech. Id.
37. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (protecting speech from
content-based regulations); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (protecting expres-
sive conduct from content-based regulations). The Court has noted that "above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding a Chicago law that barred picketing within 150 feet
of a school to be unconstitutional within the meaning of the First Amendment); see also
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating a similar picketing restriction under the
First Amendment).
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content-based restrictions.38 Examples of content based restrictions in-
clude the prohibitions against fighting words,3 9 obscenity,4" and libel.4 '
Content-based laws distinguish speech by reference to the ideas ex-
pressed; content-neutral laws, on the other hand, impose burdens or con-
fer benefits without reference to the substance of the expression.42 To
determine whether a regulation is content-neutral or content-based, the
initial inquiry is whether the government imposed the regulation because
of the message communicated.43 This motive may be evidenced from the
face of the regulation, or from its effect.44
38. See infra notes 39-41 (providing examples of content-based restrictions).
39. The Court has allowed government regulations of speech characterized as "fight-
ing words." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 954 (2d ed. 1983). The Court
first recognized this limitation on the First Amendment right to free speech in 1942. Id.;
see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-73 (upholding a state statute that proscribed "fighting
words" that are likely to ignite breaches of the peace, citing their slight social value). How-
ever, the Court subsequently limited the reach of this broad "fighting words" doctrine from
Chaplinsky. NOWAK, supra at 955-57; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(upholding the First Amendment right of an individual to wear a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" because "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
cess"). Therefore, the modern Court generally has upheld the First Amendment right of
freedom of expression and has left in doubt the validity of the fighting words doctrine.
NOWAK, supra at 957-58.
40. Generally, the courts have allowed government regulation of obscene speech. No-
WAK, supra note 39, at 1008-12. To determine whether speech is obscene and, therefore,
not constitutionally protected, it is necessary to determine if the speech, "appeals to a
prurient interest in sex .... has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific merit....
and is on the whole offensive to the average person under contemporary community stan-
dards." Id. at 1011; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485,487 (1957) (outlining
the definition of obscenity for First Amendment purposes and holding that obscenity is not
speech protected by the First Amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973)
(clarifying the third prong of the obscenity definition).
41. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952), the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a state statute that prohibited libel. See NOWAK, supra note 39, at 943. In
New York Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), however, the Court held that the
First Amendment limits a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a
public official. Id. at 944-45. Specifically, the Court required a showing of "actual malice"
as a prerequisite to an award of damages. Id.
42. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994).
43. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The threshold inquiry is
whether the government has regulated the speech "because of disagreement with the
message it conveys." Id.
44. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459. A law can be determined to be content-
based from its face and will be held unconstitutional even if a content-neutral purpose is
asserted. Id. Sometimes a facially content-neutral law will be content-based in its effect.
Id. In these instances, it is important to examine the legislative motive in imposing the law
to determine if the law is constitutional under the First Amendment. See id.; but see Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (stating that an
invalid legislative motive does not constitute a per se violation of the First Amendment);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (explaining that judicial inquiries
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1. Content-Based Regulations: Presumptively Unconstitutional Under
a Standard of Strict Scrutiny
The First Amendment is a barrier against the government restriction of
speech or expressive conduct because of the ideas expressed. 45 A law
that infringes First Amendment rights based on the content of ideas ar-
ticulated will be upheld only if it passes a strict scrutiny analysis.46 Under
this analysis, the law must address a "compelling government interest
47
and must be "narrowly tailored"48 to serve that interest.49
into congressional motives are appropriate to interpret legislation, but that courts should
not examine congressional intent in enacting an otherwise facially constitutional law). Fur-
thermore, even regulations that have a proper governmental aim may still unconstitution-
ally restrict speech under the First Amendment. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117.
45. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that
"the sole question is, or ought to be, whether the restriction is in fact content-based." Id.
at 125. He rejected the use of the strict scrutiny analysis and adopted a per se rule of
unconstitutionality if the regulation is content-based. Id. at 126. However, Justice Ken-
nedy did recognize that certain traditional categories, such as obscenity, defamation, incite-
ment, or situations presenting some grave and imminent danger that the government may
prevent, are outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Id. at 127 (citations omit-
ted); see also GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 1069-89 (detailing the traditional categories of
"speech" such as obscenity and defamation that fall outside the scope of First Amendment
protection); Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 (stating that the highest level of judi-
cial scrutiny is applied to content-based regulations); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334
(1988) (invalidating a District of Columbia regulation that prohibited political speech
within 500 feet of an embassy because it was found to be a content-based restriction on
political speech, and therefore, subject to the strict scrutiny standard).
46. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the strict scrutiny analysis in relation to a New York statute regulating authors and
publishers); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (noting the application of the strict scrutiny analysis).
47. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 120-23 (finding a compelling interest in the
compensation of victims from the "fruits of crime"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465
(1980) (finding that the state's interest in maintaining privacy in the home justified the
statute against picketing).
48. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)
(finding a state regulation preventing minors from exposure to indecent telephone calls
was not narrowly tailored).
49. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118; see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224, 232-33 (1987) (holding unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
standard an Arkansas tax on receipts from sales of tangible personal property, but exempt-
ing newspapers, "religious, professional, trade and sports journals and/or publications
printed and published within this State"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (pro-
tecting expressive conduct from content-based regulations through the strict scrutiny stan-
dard); Boos, 485 U.S. at 324 (finding a District of Columbia regulation prohibiting political
speech within 500 feet of an embassy to be a content-based restriction on political speech
that did not meet the strict scrutiny standard); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (holding that a state may reserve, for its intended pur-
poses, public property that is not by tradition or governmental designation a forum for
public communication, so long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not meant to
suppress expression solely because public officials oppose the speaker's view); Carey, 447
U.S. at 460-61. The Carey Court held an Illinois statute unconstitutional under the Equal
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As a corollary, the Court has held that the compelled access require-
ments of the media, which demand that a speaker provide a forum for
views other than its own, must also pass a strict scrutiny analysis under
the First Amendment." Although compelled access requirements appear
to promote a wide range of diverse ideas, these requirements actually
tend to inhibit debate.51 The Court has concluded, therefore, that com-
pelled access requirements may not be imposed by the government ab-
sent narrowly tailored means that serve a compelling governmental
interest.52
Further, under the First Amendment, the government may not restrict
the speech of certain individuals or groups in society to enhance the voice
of others.53 Laws enacted to restrict either the speaker or the content of
the message are analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, and such laws
generally are held to be unconstitutional.54 As an outgrowth of this prop-
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it prohibited the picketing of
residences or dwellings, but exempted the peaceful picketing of a place of employment
involved in a labor dispute. Id. at 471. The Court noted that this regulation impermissibly
depended solely on the message being conveyed and, therefore, was unconstitutional
under the strict scrutiny analysis. Id.; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 24-25 (distin-
guishing the tests used for content-neutral and content-specific regulations).
50. See e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)
(holding that it was unconstitutional under the First Amendment to require an electric and
gas company to include in its newsletter, contained in its billing envelopes, viewpoints with
which the company disagreed); see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (holding Florida's "right of reply" statute, compelling newspapers to provide
equal access to political candidates covered in the newspaper, unconstitutional); Pacific
Gas, 475 U.S. at 9 (finding that compelled access "penalizes the expression of particular
points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do
not set"); but see Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980) (holding
that state constitutional provisions allowing individuals to exercise their rights of free
speech on the property of a privately owned shopping center, open to the public, does not
violate the owner's First Amendment rights). In Pruneyard Shopping Center, the Court
distinguished Wooley v. Maryland, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and stressed that the views dissem-
inated by the protesters would most likely not be identified with the owner of the shopping
center. Id. at 86-87. Furthermore, the court noted that the owner was free to disassociate
himself from these particular views. Id. at 87.
51. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 (1964) (stating, in part, that a law compelling one to guarantee the absolute truth
of all assertions would lead to "self-censorship" and would limit public debate).
52. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19.
53. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1975). The Buckley Court held that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment" and to its
underlying principles. Id. As a result, the Court found that certain expenditure limitation
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, were uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at 51.
54. See id. at 44-45.
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osition, the Court has declared regulations that set apart members of the
press for disfavored treatment are also presumptively unconstitutional.55
2. Content-Neutral Regulations and the Application of an
Intermediate Level of Scrutiny
Regulations that are not related to the content of speech are subject to
an intermediate level of scrutiny.56 When elements of speech and non-
speech are combined, an important governmental interest, unrelated to
the suppression of the expression, may justify intrusions on the First
Amendment.57 The means chosen need not be the least restrictive means
55. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r. of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591-93 (1983). The Supreme Court held that a Minnesota tax on the cost of paper and
ink products used in the production of periodic publications, which exempted the first
$100,000 worth of paper and ink used in a year, discriminated against newspapers with a
large circulation. Therefore, the Court held that the tax was invalid under the First
Amendment. Id. The Court asserted that "differential treatment, unless justified by some
special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to
suppression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional." Id. at 585
(emphasis added); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
Ragland involved a tax scheme that exempted from the tax newspapers and "religious,
professional, trade, and sports journals and/or publications printed and published within
the State." Id. at 224. The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard and stated that if such
regulations were to be upheld, the state would have to show that the regulation was "nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id.
at 231. The Court stated that differential taxation was contrary to First Amendment princi-
ples, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 229. Specifically, the Court found that the
differential taxation was based on the content of the publication. Id.
56. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994). According to
Turner Broadcasting, the application of an intermediate scrutiny is justifiable because, in
most cases, non content-based regulations do not pose a substantial risk of "excising cer-
tain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue." Id.
57. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 376-77 (1968) (holding the 1965
Amendment to § 12(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which made
it a crime when a person "forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any
manner changes" a selective service registration certificate, constitutional under the First
Amendment intermediate level of scrutiny). O'Brien was convicted under the statute
when he burned his draft registration certificate as a means of anti-war protest. Id. at 369-
70. He attacked the statute as unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and, there-
fore, argued that his conviction was invalid. Id. at 376. However, the Court upheld the
statute and, consequently, O'Brien's conviction. Id. at 386.
The Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard to be used when government
regulations have an incidental effect on speech. Id. at 376. A governmental regulation will
be upheld:
If it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
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available; however, they cannot burden substantially more speech than is
necessary. 58
Content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions of otherwise
protected speech are treated similarly under the First Amendment.5 9 In
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,61 the Court employed an intermediate
level of scrutiny to uphold New York City's sound-amplification guide-
lines designed to regulate excessive noise at outdoor concerts in Central
Park.61 In so doing, the Court emphasized that the government may not
substantially burden speech to a greater extent than is necessary under
the circumstances. 61 The Court clarified that a regulation will not be in-
validated solely because a less restrictive means to achieve the govern-
mental objective exists.63
B. The Media and Three Different Levels of First Amendment
Protection
In response to advancing technologies, different levels of First Amend-
ment protection apply to the media depending upon the specific medium
Id. at 377; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 25 (explaining that, in cases where a regula-
tion is directed at noncommunicative activities and indirectly regulates speech, the Court
has subjected that regulation to an intermediate level of scrutiny analysis test).
58. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-800 (1989). The Court held that
"[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest ... the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court con-
cludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-re-
strictive alternative." Id. at 800. The Court upheld New York City's sound-amplification
regulations regarding "time, place, or manner of protected speech" as consistent with the
First Amendment. Id. at 798-803. The Court determined that these elements were content
neutral and, therefore, the regulations were afforded intermediate scrutiny protection. Id.
at 792.
59. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798. The Rock Against Racism Court reaffirmed
that:
[A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but
...it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.
Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regula-
tion promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation."
Id. at 798-99 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 25 (providing a description of time, place and
manner regulations).
60. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
61. Id. at 798-800.
62. Id. at 799.
63. Id. at 800. The Rock Against Racism Court held that it is not the job of the judge
to second-guess the legislature's determination so long as the regulation in question is not
overly broad. See id.; see also supra note 58 (indicating that government regulations must
not be overly broad, but that a court will not fashion its own less restrictive means).
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of communication utilized.64 Traditionally, the highest level of First
Amendment protection has been afforded to newspapers and other print
media.65 In contrast, Congress and the courts have permitted extensive
regulation of the broadcast industry.
1. Print Media and the General Application of the Strict Scrutiny
Standard
Beginning with Associated Press v. United States ,66 government regula-
tions of the press have been strictly scrutinized.67 In Associated Press, the
Court applied the strict scrutiny standard, but noted that the First
Amendment does not provide immunity for the press from antitrust
laws.68 In the seminal case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,69
the Court struck down Florida's right-of-reply statute under the strict
scrutiny analysis.7 ° The Tornillo Court reiterated the principle that a gov-
ernment may not usurp a newspaper's editorial control by requiring it to
print an article that otherwise it would not print.71
64. See Lutzker, supra note 17, at 467 (stating that different standards developed be-
cause of the law's response to various new technologies); see also FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). The Court noted that each medium of communication must
be assessed individually to determine the amount of First Amendment protection from
governmental regulations. Id. To determine the level required, a court examines the me-
dium, the FCC's purpose for instituting the regulations and the history of the regulations,
as well as prior judicial decisions on the constitutionality of the regulations. Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (1985), cert. denied sub nom. National Ass'n. of
Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). Compare Red Lion Broad-
casting Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (applying a more deferential standard and
allowing greater broadcast regulations) with Quincy Cable TV Inc., 768 F.2d at 1448 (hold-
ing must-carry regulations unconstitutional after subjecting the regulations to an interme-
diate level of scrutiny).
65. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FiFTH ESTATE
19-25 (1986) (explaining that prior restraint of the press is akin to censorship and, there-
fore, unconstitutional under a First Amendment analysis).
66. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
67. Id. at 19-20. The Associated Press Court held that the application of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to publishers attempting to restrain trade in news does not abridge the free-
dom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id.
68. Id.
69. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
70. Id. at 258. The Florida statute granted a political candidate the right to reply, in an
equal amount of space and free of cost, to criticism and attacks on his record or character
by the newspaper. Id. at 244. The statute made it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail
to comply. Id.
71. Id. at 256. The Court has consistently held that the government may not require a
newspaper to print material that it otherwise would not print. Id. Specifically, the Tornillo
Court stated that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press respon-
sibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legis-
lated." Id.
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2. Broadcast Regulations and the Most Relaxed Scrutiny Standard:
The Scarcity and Pervasiveness Rationales
The current legal structure permits extensive regulation of the broad-
cast media.72 Courts have justified these regulations under the scarcity
and pervasiveness rationales.73 Justice Frankfurter first articulated the
scarcity rationale in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States.74 Due to
the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, Congress and the FCC may consti-
tutionally regulate and license stations based on a " 'public interest, con-
venience, or necessity' "standard. 7 5 This rationale justifies content-based
broadcast regulations.76 Furthermore, it has been invoked to justify legis-
lation that imposes affirmative duties on broadcasters relating to content,
such as requiring children's educational programming.77 It has also been
The Court has long debated the issue of whether the "freedom of the press" clause in the
First Amendment entitles the media to special constitutional protection. See GUNTHER,
supra note 35, at 1456. This "freedom of the press" has created special problems including
prior restraints by the government on the press, attempts by the government to compel
journalists to divulge information, possible existence of a special right of press access to
courtrooms, jails and the like, and issues of whether or not the press enjoys a special immu-
nity from government attempts at regulation. Id. at 1455-1500.
72. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1062, 1072 (1994); see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that broadcasting has received the most limited First
Amendment protection).
A broadcaster is licensed by the FCC under a "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity" standard. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988) (stating that the FCC may grant a station's
license application in part on whether the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" will
be served by the granting of the license); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(1988) (stating that the FCC
may revoke a station's license "for willful or repeated failure to operate substantially as set
forth in the license"). Compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (invalidating right of reply stat-
utes with respect to print media as inconsistent with the First Amendment) with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the application of the
fairness doctrine in the context of broadcast regulations); see also FRED W. FRIENDLY,
THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 192-97 (1976) (arguing
that Tornillo and Red Lion are indistinguishable).
73. See infra notes 74-99 and accompanying text (outlining the scarcity and pervasive-
ness rationales used to justify extensive broadcast regulations based on content).
74. 319 U.S. 190, 193 (1943). The National Broadcasting Court noted that since "the
radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody," regulation is nec-
essary to prevent interference between signals. Id. at 213.
75. Id. at 216-17 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2
(1940)).
76. See Note, supra note 72, at 1072.
77. Id.; see Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303a(a)-(b) (Supp. 11 1990)
(requiring children's programming and regulating advertising during that programming);
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (criminalizing the radio broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language").
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invoked to justify prohibitions, such as the restrictions on indecent
broadcasts.78
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,7 9 the Court justified the fair-
ness doctrine under the scarcity rationale. 80 The fairness doctrine re-
quired radio and television broadcasters to present public issues on their
stations, and to give fair and equal coverage to each side of the issue.81
78. The pervasiveness rationale has also been invoked to justify heavy regulations,
especially with regards to indecent programming. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying
text (explaining the pervasiveness rationale that justifies extensive content-based broadcast
regulations).
79. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
80. Id. at 400-01. The Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine because "of the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legit-
imate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those fre-
quencies for expression of their views." Id. at 400.
81. Id. at 369. The fairness doctrine (repealed in 1987) placed an affirmative obliga-
tion on broadcasters to identify and broadcast controversial public issues and to provide
contrasting viewpoints on these issues. Nat'l. Ass'n. of Broadcasters, The Fairness Doctrine:
A Primer (1993) 1 (hereinafter NAB Fairness Doctrine Primer). This doctrine developed
from a long history of attempts to regulate broadcast discussions of political issues and
editorializing. Id. Stations originally were prohibited from editorializing. Id. In 1949,
however, the FCC issued its Report on Editorializing, which in effect formalized the fair-
ness doctrine. Id. The FCC allowed partisan speech so long as contrary positions were
aired. Id. In 1959, Congress amended the Communications Act to include the require-
ment that political candidates be given equal opportunities on broadcast stations. Id. The
fairness doctrine was thought to have been codified based on such broad language. Id. at 1-
2.
In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. Id. at 2;
see Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the fairness doctrine under the scarcity rationale). In 1984, however, the Court
indicated that it would review its previous holding from Red Lion if prompted by Congress
or the FCC. NAB Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra, at 2; see FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12, appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (quoting Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 393) (noting that the Court would reconsider the constitutional basis of its
decision in Red Lion if Congress or the FCC were able to show that the fairness doctrine
" '[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing speech' "). However, in a 1985
report, the FCC concluded that the fairness doctrine no longer served the public interest
and may be unconstitutional. NAB Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra, at 2. Specifically, the
FCC found that the scarcity rationale used to justify the doctrine was no longer valid due
to the growth in broadcasting and other comparable media. Id. Furthermore, the FCC
found that the doctrine had the opposite of the intended effect and actually chilled broad-
casters speech. Id.
In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that, in fact, Congress had
not codified the fairness doctrine in the Communications Act. Id.; see Telecommunications
Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress
did not codify the fairness doctrine into the Communicaiton Act and therefore the FCC
had the authority to repeal the doctrine), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). In August of
1987, the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine. NAB Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra, at 3.
In 1989, a federal appellate court upheld the FCC's decision, determining that the doctrine
no longer served the public interest, without reaching the issue of its constitutionality. Id.;
see Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that the
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The broadcasters in Red Lion alleged that the doctrine abridged their
First Amendment freedom of speech and press."2 Although noting that
broadcasting clearly implicates a First Amendment interest, the Court up-
held the regulations under the scarcity rationale.8 3 The Court found that,
in contrast to the print media where the editorial rights of the publisher
prevail, the right of the broadcast listeners or viewers to receive access to
social, political, and other ideas takes precedence over the editorial rights
of the broadcaster because of the physical limits of the medium. 4
Most recently, the Court upheld the scarcity rationale for extensive
broadcast regulation in FCC v. League of Women Voters.85 The Court
noted, however, that the scarcity rationale has been criticized in recent
years due to the emergence of cable and satellite television. 6 Still, the
Court refused to reconsider its approach unless recommended to do so by
Congress or the FCC."
Extensive content-based broadcast regulations also have been justified
by the pervasiveness rationale.88 Under certain circumstances, the pri-
vacy interests of viewers and listeners clash with, and limit, a speaker's
First Amendment rights.89 In public, a speaker's rights typically domi-
doctrine disserves the public interest because it actually thwarts its intended effect by dis-
suading broadcasters from presenting controversial viewpoints without reaching the consti-
tutionality of the doctrine), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
Congress considered codifying the fairness doctrine into the Communications Act. NAB
Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra, at 3. It decided not to after repeated threats of a Presi-
dential veto. Id.; see also CARTER, supra note 65, at 200-01 (detailing the history of the
fairness doctrine).
82. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
83. Id. at 386-88, 400-01. The Court noted the First Amendment concerns here are
distinguishable from the speech and press interests when "there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate." Id. at 388.
Therefore, the Court concluded that there is no "unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id.
84. Id. at 390.
85. 468 U.S. 364, 376, appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1205 (1984). The League of Women
Voters Court held that, despite Congress' extensive powers to regulate noncommercial ed-
ucational broadcast stations, the ban on editorializing on certain stations was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 402.
86. Id. at 376 n.ll (noting that critics argue that, as a result of cable and television
technology which provide communities with a wide range of stations, the scarcity doctrine
may be obsolete).
87. Id. The Court refused to reconsider its "approach without some signal from Con-
gress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision
of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." Id.
88. See infra notes 89-99 (outlining the pervasiveness rationale used to justify exten-
sive content-based broadcast regulations).
89. Note, supra note 72, at 1077 n.87 (stating that "[p]rivacy rights in this sense have
been seen as a negative implication of the First Amendment and have been referred to as a
right not to listen or a right not to know").
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:615
nate. 90 However, the government may limit a speaker's rights when
viewers or listeners are determined to be "a captive audience." 91 In the
home, the speaker must avoid infringing the privacy rights of the listener
or viewer.92 If it is possible for the viewer to control whether the speech
is received, however, the government may not interfere with the viewer's
choice.9 3
The pervasiveness rationale is exemplified in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,94 in which the Court upheld an FCC regulation regarding obscene,
indecent, or profane broadcasting. 95 The Court first determined that the
words of an indecent broadcast constituted "speech" within the meaning
of the First Amendment and that the FCC's regulations were content-
based.96 After noting several other instances in which content-based reg-
ulations had been upheld,97 the Court upheld the FCC's regulations.98
The Court relied on the pervasiveness of radio and television in the home
to justify allowing extensive regulations of "indecent" broadcasts. 99
90. Id. at 1077.
91. Id.; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (validating a city
ordinance prohibiting political advertisements in a city transit system due to the fact that
the commuters are a "captive audience").
92. Note, supra note 72, at 1077.
93. Id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983)).
94. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
95. Id. at 738. At issue in Pacifica was an afternoon broadcast of a satiric monologue
of" 'the words you couldn't say on the public.., airwaves.' " Id. at 729. For a full recita-
tion of the monologue, see Appendix to the Opinion of the Court. Id. at 751-55. The FCC
asserted its powers to regulate the broadcast after holding that it was indecent and prohib-
ited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Id. at 732. The FCC noted that its holding rested, in part, on the
fact that the monologue was broadcast in the early afternoon "when children were un-
doubtedly in the audience." Id.
96. Id. at 744.
97. Most specifically, the Court noted that the government may forbid speech calcu-
lated to provoke a fight. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942). Further-
more, the government may distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977). The government may treat libel
against private citizens more seriously than libel against public officials. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1973). Finally, the Court has recognized that obscenity may
be regulated, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), in part due to the fact that its
content is offensive to contemporary moral standards. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
489 (1957).
98. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51.
99. Id. at 748-49. The Court noted that the unique accessibility of broadcasting to
children supported distinguishing between broadcast and print media. Id. at 749. The
Court previously recognized in Ginsberg v. New York, that government regulations of
otherwise protected expression were upheld due in part to the government's interest in the
"well-being of its youth." 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
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3. The Applicable First Amendment Standard for Cable Television
In 1992, Congress passed the 1992 Cable Act, amending the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "1984 Cable Act")1"' and the
Communications Act of 1934.101 Prior to the 1984 Cable Act, it was un-
certain who had ultimate authority to regulate cable television.10 2 The
1984 Cable Act was implemented to establish the legislative basis for de-
veloping an unambiguous national communications policy,10 3 to assure
diversity of information sources and services,10 4 and to promote competi-
tion in the cable industry,10 5 among other goals.1 6
Cable television has experienced substantial growth since its inception
in 1950.107 During the early years, the regulation of the cable television
100. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1984) (amended by Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.)).
101. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-154 (1988); see also DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVI-
SION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 2.01 (1995).
102. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1934) (establishing the Federal Communications Com-
mission); see 47 U.S.C. § 521(3) (1988) (stating the congressional purposes of defining the
appropriate roles of regulatory authority of the FCC, the states, and local communities
over cable television); see also BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.02[31 (indicating that one
purpose of the 1984 Act was "to clarify the appropriate roles of the competitors for regula-
tory authority of cable television-the FCC, the states, and the local communities").
103. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.021]; see 47 U.S.C. § 521(1) (stating a congressional
purpose of the 1984 Act was to establish a national communications policy).
104. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.02[4]; see 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (stating that a major
purpose of the 1984 Act was to "assure that cable communications provide and are en-
couraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public").
105. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.02[6]; see 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (stating that an overall
theme of the 1984 Act was to "promote competition in cable communications and mini-
mize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable
systems").
106. See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (outlining Congress' findings and purposes for the 1984 Act).
The other stated goals of the 1984 Cable Act were to "establish franchise procedures and
standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and which assure
that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community," 47
U.S.C. § 521(2); and "to establish an orderly process for franchise renewal." 47 U.S.C.
§ 521(5); see also BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.02[1]-[61 (explaining congressional pur-
poses of the 1984 Cable Act).
107. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 162 (1968). Early in
their history, cable systems, then called community antenna television or CATV, received
the signals of broadcasting stations and transmitted them by wire to subscribers. Id. at 161-
62; see also id. at 161 n.8 (providing the definition of-cable television promulgated by the
Federal Communications Commission). Originally, cable systems did not produce their
own programming. Id. at 161-62. Traditionally then, cable systems performed two basic
functions. Id. at 163. First, they provided for unobstructed reception of broadcast stations
and, second, they provided for the importation of distant signals beyond the range of local
antennae. Id Cable television has experienced remarkable growth since these early years,
and is now a significant source of both broadcast and original programming. Turner
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industry was left primarily to local authorities. °8 As the cable industry
grew, the FCC indirectly exercised jurisdiction over cable systems under
its authority to regulate microwave relay systems. 109 It was during this
period that the FCC first implemented must-carry regulations.10 The
Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television in United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co."' Until 1975, the FCC's primary concern was
the relationship between cable and broadcasting. 1 2 As the industry
grew, however, the FCC became more concerned with the emergence of
cable as part of the national communications structure and further en-
tered the field of regulation.1" 3 In United States v. Midwest Video
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 2445, 2451. See also CARTER, supra note 65, at 335-38
(providing a general description of the growth of the cable industry). Consequently, cable
television has created substantial competition for broadcast stations. Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2451.
For a detailed explanation of the basic principles of cable television technology, recent
technological developments, and the future of cable television, see GARY L. CHRISTENSEN,
CABLE TELEVISION RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE 13-35 (1985). Mr. Christensen
concludes that cable television uses a flexible technology and is able to deliver a great
variety of programming to its customers. Id. at 35. He foresees channel capacity continu-
ing to increase to accommodate new services, and that local advertising on cable channels
will increase, thereby adding to subscription revenues. Id.
108. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[1]. The FCC first considered its jurisdiction over
cable regulation in 1958. Id. Specifically, in Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C.
251 (1958), the FCC declined to exercise jurisdiction over cable systems as common carri-
ers under Section 3(h) of the 1934 Communications Act, which is now codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1988). Furthermore, the FCC determined that it did not have the statutory au-
thority to regulate cable television pursuant to Titles II and III of the 1934 Communica-
tions Act. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[1]; see also In re CATV & TV Repeater
Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-31 (1959) (detailing the FCC's findings that it did not have the
jurisdiction to regulate the cable television industry).
109. See Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 165 (recounting the growth and concomi-
tant regulation of the cable television industry); BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.02[2].
110. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (providing a detailed explanation of
early must-carry regulations).
111. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In Southwestern Cable Co., the Court held that the agency's
statutory power extended to the regulation of cable television. Id. at 178; see e.g., BREN-
NER, supra note 101, § 2.03[2]. The Court based the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate cable on
its authority to regulate broadcast television, thereby limiting its seemingly broad power to
regulate cable systems. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178 (detailing the FCC's juris-
diction over cable television); see e.g., BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[2]. The significant
aspect of Southwestern Cable Co. was its attempt to define cable television and to deter-
mine who exercised jurisdiction over the industry. Id.
112. See BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[4] (discussing federal interests regarding
cable and broadcasting).
113. Id. (discussing the FCC's increased regulation regarding cable). The FCC pre-
empted local regulation. Id. Under the Preemption Doctrine, once Congress has regu-
lated an area of Federal interest, implicitly or explicitly, state and local governments are
prevented from regulating that same area under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Id. § 2.04[2]. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (providing the authority for the preemption
doctrine). The Doctrine of Preemption with regard to cable regulation has now been
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Corp.,a14 the Court validated the FCC's additional jurisdiction ancillary
to its authority to regulate broadcast stations by granting the FCC the
authority to regulate CATV, the predecessor of cable television.' 1
5
The courts curtailed the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television after
1975.116 However, the FCC implemented its own policy of cable deregu-
lation to stimulate the growth of the industry."17 Congress ultimately
passed the 1984 Cable Act to create a national policy of deregulation for
the cable industry to promote growth and competition within the indus-
try.'1 8 Eight years later, Congress re-regulated the cable industry with
the 1992 Cable Act.119
Cable television operators and programmers are engaged in speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment and, therefore, are entitled
to protection accordingly.' The Court, in the past, has failed to defini-
tively establish the level of First Amendment protection available to
largely replaced with the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts. See BRENNER, supra note 101,
§ 2.04[2]. For a detailed account of the history of the Doctrine of Preemption and its rela-
tion to the regulation of cable television, see BRENNER, supra note 101, §§ 2.04-2.05[2][h]
(explaining the Doctrine of Preemption and the FCC Preemption Policy, and its relation-
ship to the 1984 Cable Act).
114. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) [hereinafter Midwest I].
115. Id. at 662-63 (upholding the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate CATV based on its
authority to regulate broadcast television). The Court in Midwest I upheld the FCC's stat-
utory authority to prescribe program orientation rules for cable television as justified by its
authority to regulate broadcast television. Id. The dissent complained that this policy
stretched the FCC's jurisdiction too far, in effect forcing cable operators to become broad-
casters. Id. at 681 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[5] (discussing the deregulation of the federal pro-
gram relating to Cable regulation); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 49
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (invalidating the FCC's anti-siphoning rules, designed to keep
certain programming such as sports events, from migrating to competing services of broad-
cast television), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Federal Communications Commission v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979) [hereinafter Midwest II] (overturning com-
mon carrier access and channel capacity rules, as beyond the scope of the FCC's jurisdic-
tion under the 1934 Communications Act).
117. BRENNER, supra note 101, § 2.03[5]. The FCC reexamined its principal justifica-
tion for cable regulations, namely that the growth of cable was reasonably related to the
decline in broadcasting. Id. The FCC shifted the burden from the cable industry to prove
that they were not harming local broadcast stations through the importation of distant
signals. Id. The burden was now on the broadcasters to show harm. Id.
118. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the 1984 Cable
Act).
119. See infra notes 145-64 and accompanying text (discussing the 1992 Cable Act, spe-
cifically the must-carry provisions of § 4 and § 5).
120. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. at 2445, 2456 (1994) (stating that
"[c]able programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment"); see
also Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.
1985) (concluding that cable television operators and programmers enjoy some First
Amendment protection), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
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cable television with regard to must-carry requirements until the issue
was decided in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission.121 In Turner Broadcasting, the Court concluded that
must-carry regulations were entitled to the intermediate scrutiny applied
to non-content based regulations. 22
C. Must-Carry Regulations
The principle behind the must-carry regulations was first articulated in
Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC.1 23 In Carter Mountain, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
FCC's rationale for denying a television microwave-system license to a
common carrier.' 24 Specifically, the court recognized that the protection
of a local broadcast television station constitutes a "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity. ,121 Consequently, the court granted the carrier
the option of refiling for a license, contingent upon a showing that they
would carry the local broadcast station without duplicating its
programming.1
26
In 1965, the FCC first codified this principle into must-carry regula-
tions.127 Originally, these regulations required system operators to carry
local broadcast stations in order to receive the microwave license neces-
sary to import distant broadcast signals. 128 After one year, the rules were
extended to cover all cable systems and were further expanded in subse-
quent regulations.129 The overriding purpose of the rules was to protect
121. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57; see e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 716 (1984) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the adver-
tisement of alcoholic beverages on both cable and broadcast television based on federal
preemption grounds and, furthermore, not addressing the First Amendment issue
presented).
122. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
123. 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
124. Id. at 363-64 (stating that the FCC may deny a station a license based on the
'public interest, convenience, or necessity' " standard without contradicting the First
Amendment). See also Lutzker, supra note 17, at 478-79 (explaining the holding and signif-
icance of the Carter Mountain decision).
125. Carter Mountain, 321 F.2d at 364 (stating that it is not a denial of free speech to
deny a license to transmit radio or television programs because the public interest standard
has not been met).
126. Id. at 363-64.
127. Lutzker, supra note 17, at 477.
128. Id.; In re Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713 (1965) (conclud-
ing that carriage and nonduplication requirements are appropriate means to create fair
competition between CATV and broadcasting stations).
129. Lutzker, supra note 17, at 477; see also In re CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 769 (1966)
(concluding that public interest supported the application of must-carry regulations to all
CATV systems); Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 173-76 (1972) (ex-
panding the regulations farther and establishing the signals required to be carried).
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local broadcast stations from the threat of possible elimination at the en-
circling hands of cable television.' 30
The United States Court of Appeals, approximately twenty years later,
struck down the FCC's must-carry rules in 1985 as unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.1 3 1 The court recognized that the FCC, using the
best interests of the public standard, promulgated must-carry rules to pro-
tect local television.'32 Originally the FCC could not prove the factual
predicates necessary for the enactment of these rules.' 33 The court never-
theless noted that the FCC undertook a series of revisions regarding the
must-carry requirements without reconsidering the theoretical premises
on which the rules were based.13 4 The court questioned these regulations
on First Amendment grounds. 135 Concluding that the more relaxed stan-
dard for broadcast regulations was inappropriate in the cable context, 36
the court determined that the rules clearly failed the O'Brien balancing
130. Lutzker, supra note 17, at 477.
131. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that
the must-carry regulations at issue were insufficiently tailored to justify their interference
with First Amendment rights and therefore violative of the Constitution), cert. denied sub
nom. National Ass'n. of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); see
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1994) (codifying the must-carry regulations at issue in Quincy).
132. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1442 (concluding that the FCC promulgated must-carry regu-
lations to guard local broadcasters from destruction).
133. Id.
134. Id. The court noted that this was in marked contrast to general FCC policy and
practice. Id. For example, the court noted that the FCC's prior regulations requiring dis-
tant-signal-carriage and the syndicated-exclusivity rules were later eliminated after exhaus-
tive studies. Id. Like the must-carry requirements, .these rules originally were
promulgated to protect the broadcasting industry from competition by the cable industry.
Id.
135. Id. at 1443-45. The court initially discussed the First Amendment standard for
cable television adopted in previous cases. Id. The court noted that the most common
approach was to treat broadcast and cable television consistently. Id. at 1443; see Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying the more relaxed stan-
dard of review used for broadcast regulations in the cable context). The court in Quincy
compared this approach with one where the regulations were upheld only after surviving
an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1443-44; see Buckeye Cablevision,
Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that distant signal rules promul-
gated by the FCC were not an illegal restraint on First Amendment rights because the
restraint was no greater than what was reasonably required to promote the public interest).
The initial treatment of the issue in the lower federal courts was to sustain these regula-
tions; however, the trend has been to subject the regulations to more exacting scrutiny.
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1443-44; see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48-50 (D.C.
Cir.) (invalidating cable regulations under an intermediate scrutiny analysis) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977). The Quincy court concluded by noting that the Supreme Court had
never addressed the constitutionality of the must-carry rules. Quincy, 768 F.2d. at 1445.
136. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1447. In particular, the court concluded that the scarcity ra-
tionale as applied to broadcast television does not justify regulation of cable television
because cable systems have the technological capacity to carry a large volume of stations.
See id. at 1448.
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approach,137 and thus it was unnecessary to determine if a more exacting
level of scrutiny was warranted. 138 The court noted, however, that the
must-carry rules were not unconstitutional per se and invited the FCC to
redraft the rules consistent with its opinion.1 39
The FCC accepted the court's invitation and redrafted the must-carry
regulations, only to have them held unconstitutional again in Century
Communications Corp. v. FCC.140 The FCC, in a significant move,
changed its rationale and argued that the rules were necessary to guaran-
tee access to broadcast television during the period when customers be-
came familiar with an "input-selector device."' 14 ' The rules, the FCC
argued, further decreased the number of channels a cable system must
carry, limited the pool of potential commercial and noncommercial chan-
nels that were required carriage, and established a provision where cable
operators were not required to carry more than one station affiliated with
the same network. 42 Ultimately, the court did not determine the appro-
priate level of scrutiny for must-carry regulations because the FCC
regulations failed the intermediate review of O'Brien.'43 The attitude of
137. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O'Brien Court outlined
the intermediate level of scrutiny analysis to be used when a governmental regulation im-
poses an incidental burden on speech. Id.; see supra note 21 (setting out the specific test to
determine whether a governmental regulation is justified).
138. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1148. Most specifically, the Quincy court found that, even
assuming arguendo that the preservation of local broadcasting was an important govern-
mental interest, the FCC failed to carry its substantial burden of justification because it did
not reexamine its justifications for the rules' original promulgation for the past twenty
years. Id. at 1457. The court declined to answer whether, in the abstract, the preservation
of free local television is an important and substantial governmental interest. Id. at 1459.
Furthermore, the court determined that the rules failed the second prong of the test be-
cause they were overly broad. Id. Specifically, the rules protected all broadcast stations
from the alleged threat of cable television regardless of the broadcast station's economic
situation. Id. at 1461.
139. Id. at 1463.
140. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
141. Id. at 296. The "input-selector device," more commonly known as an A/B switch,
allows viewers to flick a switch to alternate between cable and broadcast programming. Id.
The Commission estimated this transition period would last five years. Id.
142. Id. at 296-97; see 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.55 to 76.56 (1994) (establishing definitions appli-
cable to the must-carry rules and signal carriage obligations).
143. Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 298-304. The court held that:
in the absence of record evidence in support of its policy, the FCC's reimposition
of must-carry rules on a five-year basis neither clearly furthers a substantial gov-
ernmental interest nor is of brief enough duration to be considered narrowly tai-
lored so as to satisfy the O'Brien test for incidental restrictions on speech.
Id. at 304.
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the court, however, seemed to favor future cable and must-carry
regulations. 1
44
II. THE 1992 CABLE Acr: RE-REGULATION OF A BURGEONING
INDUSTRY
A. The 1992 Cable Act and the Must-Carry Regulations
The most contentious requirements of the 1992 Cable Act are the
must-carry provisions contained in sections four and five. 145 In general, a
cable operator with twelve or fewer usable activated channels must carry
the signals of at least three local commercial television stations. 146 The
operator is exempted from the carriage requirements of section four if
the cable system has less than 300 subscribers, and the broadcast signals
are not entirely deleted.147 Section four of the Act requires cable systems
with more than twelve channels to broadcast local stations from the same
market as the cable system.148 However, no more than one-third of a
cable system's channel capacity must carry such broadcast stations. 149
Cable systems must be devoted to carrying the broadcast programming in
its entirety without compensation. 150 Regarding local noncommercial ed-
144. See id. The court specifically noted that the must-carry rules were not per se un-
constitutional. Id. The court clarified its position by stating: "we reluctantly conclude that
the FCC has not [met its burden in this case] .... Accordingly, we have no choice but to
strike down this latest embodiment of must-carry." Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added).
145. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (Supp. V 1994). Specifically, the regulations regarding car-
riage obligations state that:
[e]ach cable operator shall carry, on the cable system of that operator, the signals
of local commercial television stations and qualified low power stations as pro-
vided by this section. Carriage of additional broadcast television signals on such
system shall be at the discretion of such operator, subject to section 325(b) of this
title.
Id. Furthermore, the regulations require that "[iun addition to the carriage requirements
set forth in section 534 of this title, each cable operator of a cable system shall carry the
signals of qualified noncommercial educational television stations in accordance with the
provisions of this section." Id. § 535(a).
146. Id. § 534(b)(1)(A). The regulations specifically state that, as a general rule, "[a]
cable operator of a cable system with 12 or fewer usable activated channels shall carry the
signals of at least three local commercial television stations." Id.
147. Id. The regulations provide an exception to the general rule that a cable system
with twelve or fewer channels shall carry at least three broadcast stations, namely, that "if
such a system has 300 or fewer subscribers, it shall not be subject to any requirements
under this section so long as such system does not delete from carriage by that system any
signal of a broadcast television station." Id.
148. Id. § 534(b)(1)(B).
149. Id. The regulations state that "[a] cable operator of a cable system with more than
12 usable activated channels shall carry the signals of local commercial television stations,
up to one-third of the aggregate number of usable activated channels of such system." Id.
150. Id. § 534(b)(3)(B). The regulations state that "[t]he cable operator shall carry the
entirety of the program schedule of any television station carried on the cable system un-
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ucational television stations, a cable operator with twelve or fewer chan-
nels must carry the signal of one qualified station, 51 while a system with
thirteen to thirty-six must carry at least one, but not more than three;
qualified stations.152
Both systems are subject to subsection (c) of the Act, requiring that
cable systems carry all qualified local noncommercial educational televi-
sion stations that were carried as of March 29, 1990.153 A cable system
with more than thirty-six channels must carry every noncommercial
educational television station requesting carriage, except stations that are
substantially duplicative.' 54 Like section four, section five requires that
cable systems carry the programming in its entirety without
compensation. 155
Congress promulgated the 1992 Cable Act after conducting three years
of hearings regarding the cable television industry.156 The bill launched a
battle between the cable television industry, which was opposed to the
less carriage of specific programming is prohibited." Id. Furthermore, the regulations
specify that "[a] cable operator shall not accept or request monetary payment or other
valuable consideration in exchange either for carriage of local commercial television sta-
tions ... or for the channel positioning rights." Id. § 534(b)(10).
151. Id. § 535(b)(2)(A). The must-carry regulations provide that "a cable operator of a
cable system with 12 or fewer usable activated channels shall be required to carry the
signal of one qualified local noncommercial educational television station." Id.
152. Id. § 535(b)(3)(A)(i). The regulations state specifically that "system[s] with 13 to
36 usable activated channels ... shall carry the signal of at least one qualified local non-
commercial educational television station but shall not be required to carry the signals of
more than three such stations." Id.
153. Id. § 535(c). The regulations provide, however, that "[tihe requirements of this
subsection may be waived with respect to a particular cable operator and a particular such
station, upon the written consent of the cable operator and the station." Id.
154. Id. § 535(e). The must-carry regulations provide that:
a cable operator of a cable system with a capacity of more than 36 usable acti-
vated channels which is required to carry the signals of three qualified local non-
commercial educational television stations shall not be required to carry the
signals of additional such stations the programming of which substantially dupli-
cates the programming broadcast by another qualified local noncommercial edu-
cational television station requesting carriage.
Id.
155. Id. § 535(g)(1)-(2). The regulations provide that:
a cable operator shall retransmit in its entirety... [and a] cable operator shall not
accept monetary payment or other valuable consideration in exchange for car-
riage ... [with the exception that a] cable operator shall not be required to add
the signals of a qualified local noncommercial educational television station not
already carried . . . where such signal would be considered a distant signal for
copyright purposes unless such station indemnifies the cable operator for any in-
creased copyright costs resulting from carriage of such signal.
Id.
156. See supra notes 3 and 4, and accompanying text (citing congressional hearings and
congressional findings stated in the Act).
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legislation, and the broadcasting industry and consumer protection orga-
nizations, which strongly supported the bill.157 The bill caused a political
battle as well, ultimately handing President Bush the first and only over-
ride of his presidential veto. 158
The Act lists Congress' conclusions regarding its investigation of the
cable industry and the reasons for the promulgation of the Act.159 Sig-
nificantly, Congress found that monthly rates for cable television had in-
creased steadily since rate deregulation began in 1984.160 Congress found
sufficient competition lacking between local cable systems. 161 Congress
determined that cable had become vertically and horizontally inte-
grated. 62 Furthermore, Congress characterized broadcast stations as an
important source of local news and programming, critical for an informed
electorate, and noted that there is a substantial governmental interest in
promoting the continued availability of this free television program-
157. See Kirk Victor, Cable Stakes Were as High as They Come, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
Oct. 10, 1992, at 2313-15 (describing the key players in support of the Act as the broadcast-
ing industry, represented primarily by the National Association of Broadcasters and CBS,
Inc., the consumer protection organizations, represented primarily by the Consumer Fed-
eration of America, and the independent television stations, while opposition to the legisla-
tion primarily came from the cable industry and Hollywood, via the Motion Picture
Association of America). See also Kirk Victor, Down to the Wire, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
May 16, 1992, at 1175-80 (describing the lobbying war between the supporters and oppo-
nents of the 1992 Cable Act).
158. See supra note 2 (listing the margin of victory for the supporters of the 1992 Cable
Act). The 1992 Cable Bill was a fierce political battle between President Bush and con-
gressional Democrats. As for President Bush's reasons for vetoing the Cable Bill, he
stated in his veto message to the United States Senate on October 3, 1992, "I am returning
herewith without my approval S. 12, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992. This bill illustrates good intentions gone wrong, fallen prey to special
interests." Mike Mills, Bush Asks for a Sign of Loyalty; Congress Changes the Channel,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Oct. 10, 1992, at 3149; see also Victor, supra note 157, at
2313 (describing President Bush's strong opposition to the 1992 Cable Bill and the even-
tual override sustained with substantial Republican support).
159. See supra note 3 (citing congressional findings within the Act).
160. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Specifically, Congress concluded that the
average monthly cable rate had increased almost three times as much as the Consumer
Price Index since deregulation in 1984. Id.
161. Id. § 521(a)(2).
162. Id. § 521(a)(4)-(5). Specifically, "[tihe cable industry has become highly concen-
trated. The potential effects of such concentration are barriers to entry for new program-
mers and a reduction in the number of media voices available to consumers." Id.
§ 521(a)(4). Furthermore, Congress specifically found that "[tihe cable industry has be-
come vertically integrated; cable operators and cable programmers often have common
ownership. As a result, cable operators have the [economic] incentive ... to favor their
affiliated programmers." Id. § 521(a)(5); see also Lutzker, supra note 17, at 487 (detailing
Congressional findings that the cable industry has become horizontally and vertically inte-
grated thereby decreasing competitiop).
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ming. 16  Finally, Congress found economic incentives for cable television
to refuse to carry broadcast signals, and concluded that carriage require-
ments were necessary for the economic survival of broadcast
television.'
64
B. Court Challenges to the 1992 Must-Carry Provisions
Immediately after the 1992 Cable Act became law, several suits were
filed challenging inter alia the constitutionality of the must-carry regula-
tions.165 In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,66 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the must-carry provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act as consistent with the First Amendment. 167
Initially, the court outlined several economic reasons why Congress
promulgated the Act, and, more particularly, the must-carry rules.' 68 De-
ferring to these findings, the court concluded that the must-carry rules
were content-neutral (as opposed to content-specific), imposed an "inci-
dental burden" on speech, and were, therefore, subject to an intermediate
level of First Amendment scrutiny.169 In applying the intermediate scru-
tiny standard, 7 ° the court recognized the importance of local broadcast-
163. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(11)-(12). Congress concluded that: "[b]roadcast television sta-
tions continue to be an important source of local news and public affairs programming and
other local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate .... There is a substantial
governmental interest in promoting the continued availability of such free television pro-
gramming." Id.
164. Id. § 521(a)(15)-(16). Specifically, Congress concluded that because broadcast and
cable television compete for advertising revenues, by carrying the broadcast signal, the
cable system theoretically is taking advertising revenues from the broadcasters. Id.
§ 521(a)(14).
165. See supra note 18 (listing the suits filed challenging the 1992 Cable Act).
166. 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445, vacated
remanded, sub nom. National Interfaith Cable Coalition v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2730 (1994).
167. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 36 (holding that the must-carry provisions of
§ 4 and § 5 of the 1992 Act do not violate plaintiffs' First Amendment rights).
168. Id. at 39-41.
169. Id. at 40-41. The court found that the must-carry provisions are not viewpoint
based, do not compel the carriage of any particular message, and do not propose burdens
because of the messages carried. Id. at 40. The court did recognize that the must-carry
provisions may be "marginally" content-related. Id. at 44. The court stressed the eco-
nomic motives of Congress in enacting the legislation, however, and refused to second-
guess congressional findings. Id. at 40-41.
170. The appropriate test for content-neutral based regulations that impose an inciden-
tal burden on speech originated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968),
and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989). Turner Broadcasting, 819
F. Supp. at 39, 41. Specifically, the regulations must: (1) "further a significant government
interest"; and (2) be "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 45. This second
requirement is satisfied if "the government's regulation will effectively remedy the condi-
tion that the government has identified as in need of correction, and if it does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary in doing so." Id. Furthermore, the means cho-
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ing 171 and recognized that Congress had compiled an extensive record
which demonstrated that local broadcasting was in serious jeopardy.172
Furthermore, the court found that even if the broadcasting industry was
not currently in serious peril, the economic conditions of the industry
made the demise of local broadcasting a very legitimate concern. 173 The
court found that the regulations passed the second prong of the First
Amendment test; 174 specifically, the court determined that the must-carry
regulations were sufficiently tailored to achieve Congress' goals without
over-burdening speech, even though the regulations might not necessarily
be the least restrictive means available for Congress to achieve its
objectives.175
Turner Broadcasting appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether the must-carry provisions violated the First
Amendment.176 Initially, the Court recognized that cable programmers
and cable operators transmit speech, and are protected under the First
Amendment.177 The Court then established that the must-carry rules
regulate speech by reducing the number of channels over which cable
operators exercise control, and by making it more difficult for cable pro-
grammers to compete for the limited number of channels remaining.1 78
Recognizing that not every interference with speech is subjected to the
same level of First Amendment scrutiny, the Court first directed its atten-
tion to the appropriate level of scrutiny for the must-carry regulations.'
79
Initially, the Court reviewed the state of current First Amendment
standards applicable to the media.' 0 The print media, such as newspa-
pers, enjoy the highest level of protection under the First Amendment.18'
sen by the government need not be the least restrictive means available. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. at 798 (noting that "the importance of broadcasting generally, and in
particular local broadcasting, to the American public is now beyond dispute").
171. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F.Supp. at 45; see also National Ass'n. of Broadcasters v.
FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the important governmental inter-
est in local broadcasting designed to serve the public).
172. See Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 46.
173. See id. (noting the position of power that cable operators wield over the market).
174. Id. at 47.
175. See id. Once again, the court refused to second-guess "Congress' determination
that the must-carry provisions are necessary to accomplish its objective." Id.
176. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (1994).
177. Id. at 2456.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.; see also supra notes 66-99 and accompanying text (detailing the different
standards of First Amendment protection afforded to the print and broadcast media, and
the justifications for each standard).
181. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716-19 (1931) (noting that freedom of the press is
an especially cherished constitutional right, and, therefore, prior restraint of this freedom
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In contrast, broadcast television, due to its unique characteristics, re-
ceives the least amount of First Amendment protection. 182 The exact
level of protection afforded to cable television regarding must-carry regu-
lations was not definitively determined until Turner Broadcasting.183
Rejecting Turner Broadcasting's arguments that the must-carry rules
were content-based and thus required the application of the strict scru-
tiny standard, the Court determined that the regulations were content-
neutral and imposed an incidental burden on speech. Therefore, the
must-carry regulations were subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny
set forth in O'Brien and Ward.18 4 The Court also rejected several other
arguments for applying the strict scrutiny standard to the must-carry reg-
ulations.185 Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court re-
will be allowed only in rare instances); see also FRIENDLY, supra note 72, at 197 (stating
that "[t]he Court has consistently reserved for the printed press First Amendment protec-
tions which it is not prepared to extend to other, more recently developed channels of
communication").
182. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (declaring that "of all forms
of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection"); see also supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text (explaining the scarcity
and pervasiveness rationales that are used to justify extensive content-based broadcast
regulations).
183. See Lutzker, supra note 17, at 481-82. The courts have not determined where
cable television belongs between the print and broadcast media. Id. This is due to the
"hybrid" nature of cable television, which is part "common carrier," part "newspaper," and
part "broadcaster." Id. at 482.
184. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994). The Court
began its analysis by rejecting the government's argument that the least restrictive test
applied to broadcast regulations should be imposed on cable, stating that the scarcity ra-
tionale that justifies extensive broadcast regulations does not apply in the context of cable
regulation. Id. at 2456-57. However, the Court also concluded that the strict scrutiny
available for content regulations was also inappropriate. Id. at 2469. The Court deter-
mined that non-content based regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny because
these regulations pose a less substantial risk of removing specifically targeted views from
the public. Id. at 2468-69. To determine whether a regulation is content-neutral or con-
tent-specific, the threshold inquiry is "whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys." Id. at 2459.
Generally, laws that distinguish speech based on the ideas expressed are content-based,
while those that do not reference the particular viewpoint are content-neutral. Id. The
Court then determined that the must-carry regulations are neutral on their face because
they impose burdens and confer benefits without regard to content. Id. at 2460. Further-
more, the Court found that the regulations distinguish between the particular manners of
communication and not between the messages themselves. Id. The Court also found that
Congress' principal objective in enacting the must-carry legislation was not to favor speech
of a particular content, but to preserve public access to free television programming. Id. at
2461.
185. Specifically, the Court rejected appellants' arguments that the must-carry regula-
tions "(1) compel speech by cable operators, (2) favor broadcast programmers over cable
programmers, and (3) single out certain members of the press for disfavored treatment."
Id. at 2464. In dismissing the argument that the must-carry regulations "compel speech,"
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jected the district court's determination of constitutionality for the must-
carry regulations and the subsequent granting of summary judgment for
the government on the record before the Court.1 16 While recognizing
that courts must give substantial deference to congressional findings in
such instances, the Court nevertheless declared that some meaningful ju-
dicial review was necessary.18 7 The Court examined the evidence and de-
termined that it was insufficient to establish that the broadcast industry
actually was in serious peril; furthermore, the Court remained uncon-
vinced that the must-carry regulations actually would remedy the stated
ills of the broadcasting industry.188 Finally, the Court noted the absence
of any judicial findings of less restrictive means for achieving the govern-
ment's objectives.189 Therefore, recognizing that questions of material
fact still remained, the Court remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings. 90
the Court distinguished the must-carry regulations from the right of reply statute struck
down in Miami v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the case most heavily relied upon by appel-
lants. Id. at 2464-65. The Court first noted that the regulations are not content-based and
that they would not require cable operators to alter their speech because of the broadcast
messages that were required to be carried. Id. Furthermore, the Court observed that
cable operators have a greater control over their medium than do newspaper publishers.
Id. at 2466.
Rejecting the argument of appellants that the must-carry regulations favor broadcast
programmers over cable programmers, the Court distinguished these regulations from the
ones struck down in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976), in which the Court stated
that the government cannot restrict the speech of some in society to enhance the voice of
others. Id. at 2466-67. The Court in Turner Broadcasting stated that Buckley stands for
the proposition that laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when
the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference. Id. at 2467.
Finally, the Court rejected appellants' argument that the must-carry laws signal out cer-
tain members of the press, in this case cable operators, for disfavored treatment. See id. at
2467-68. Recognizing that regulations that discriminate among the media "often present
serious First Amendment concerns," the Court explained that "heightened scrutiny is un-
warranted when the differential treatment is 'justified by some special characteristic of' the
particular medium being regulated," rather than by the content of the message. Id. at
2468. The Court found that the must-carry provisions were justified due to the special
characteristics of the cable medium itself: "[Tlhe bottleneck monopoly power exercised by
cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television."
Id. Furthermore, the regulations were broad-based and applied to almost all cable systems
across the country. Id.
186. Id. at 2469-72 (finding that the record was insufficient to determine whether the
government had satisfied an intermediate level of scrutiny, and therefore the grant of sum-
mary judgment for the government was erroneous).
187. ld at 2471.
188. Id. at 2472. The Court noted a complete lack of any findings on the actual extent
to which must-carry regulations interfere with protected speech; without such findings, the
Court cannot say whether the must-carry provisions "suppress 'substantially more speech
than ... necessary' to ensure the viability of broadcast television." Id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
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The dissent argued that the must-carry requirements were content-
based regulations and, therefore, should be subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis.191 Applying this analysis, the dissent found the governmental'
interests important, but not necessarily compelling. 19 Moreover, even
assuming that the regulations were content-neutral as the majority deter-
mined, the dissent nevertheless found that the must-carry regulations still
failed the application of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.' 93
III. MUST-CARRY REGULATIONS: AN UNNECESSARY SOLUTION
A. Must-Carry Regulations: Content-Neutral or Content-Specific?
The most significant determination made by the Supreme Court in Tur-
ner Broadcasting was that the must-carry regulations were content-neu-
191. Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
O'Connor dissent points to the findings of Congress that are detailed in the Act itself to
support the determination that the regulations are based on content. Id. Specifically,
Justice O'Connor notes certain congressional findings:
There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a
diversity of views provided through multiple technology media... [P]ublic televi-
sion provides educational and informational programming to the Nation's citi-
zens, thereby advancing the Government's compelling interest in educating its
citizens .... A primary objective and benefit of our Nation's system of regulation
of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming. There is a sub-
stantial governmental interest in ensuring its continuation .... Broadcast televi-
sion stations continue to be an important source of local news and public affairs
programming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor argues that these "[p]references for diversity of
viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and for news and public affairs all
make reference to content." Id. at 2477. Justice O'Connor concluded that, no matter how
praiseworthy the regulations were, they were content-based and therefore must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See id.
192. Id. at 2478. The only interest that the dissent found that even possibly approached
the standard of a compelling government interest was that of promoting educational or
news programming. Id. However, the dissent concluded that the means chosen to serve
this interest were overly broad. Id. at 2479. For example, the regulations, while burdening
cable entertainment programs, also burdened cable educational and news networks such as
CNN, C-SPAN, and the Discovery Channel. Id.
193. Id. The dissent specifically argued that the regulations were overly broad, that is
they restricted too much speech that did not implicate the governmental interests of diver-
sity, localism, educational or public affairs programming. See id. at 2478-79. Furthermore,
the dissent concluded that the regulations did not advance the interests of protecting local
stations economically without burdening a substantial amount of unrelated speech. Id. In
conclusion, Justice Ginsberg adopted the position of D.C. Circuit Judge Williams. Id. at
2481 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Turner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58, 63 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J. dissenting) (arguing
that the regulations are content-based restrictions and "[the] facts do not support an infer-
ence that over-the-air TV is at risk")).
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tral and thus subject only to intermediate scrutiny. 194 This issue was
crucial, for the must-carry rules would have been declared unconstitu-
tional under a strict scrutiny standard.
In determining that the must-carry regulations were content-based, the
dissent failed to recognize the overwhelming evidence indicating that
Congress promulgated the must-carry rules to correct economic imbal-
ances within the video industry and to promote competition. 195 The rules
themselves provide for carriage of broadcast stations no matter what the
broadcast station is carrying, or what it is replacing on cable.' 96 For in-
stance, carriage could be required in place of a cable channel that pro-
vides educational or even local news programming. 197 This is possible, in
light of the existence of educational channels on cable systems such as the
Discovery Channel and the Learning Channel, as well as local news pro-
gramming channels, such as NewsChannel 8 in the Washington, D.C.
area. If Congress had intended to promote content-based programming,
it surely would have safeguarded these stations from elimination as a re-
sult of the must-carry regulations. It stands to logic, therefore, that as
promulgated, the regulations are content-neutral and were designed as a
tool to correct market imbalances.
194. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (outlining the arguments advanced
by the appellants for the application of the strict scrutiny standard)..The main argument
proposed by appellants was that the regulations were content-based and therefore must
pass the strict scrutiny test before being upheld. Id. However, the appellants other secon-
dary arguments also rested on a determination of whether the regulations were content
based. Id.
195. See The 1992 Cable Act § 2(a)-(b). Congress stated explicitly the policy of the
Act:
(1) promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and informa-
tion through cable television and other video distribution media;
(2) rely on the market place ... to achieve that availability;
(3) ensure that cable operators continue to expand, where economically justi-
fied, their capacity and the programs offered over their cable systems;
(4) where cable television systems are not subject to effective competition, en-
sure that consumer interests are protected in receipt of cable service; and
(5) ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market power vis-
a-vis video programmers and consumers.
Id. § 2(b)(1)-(5).
196. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2453-54, 2476-77 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. See id.
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B. Broadcast and Cable Television and an Evolving
Single Standard of Regulation
The broadcast and cable television industries are distinguishable pri-
marily by the respective technologies they employ to reach viewers. 198
But the two industries are very different in other ways as well. 199 Broad-
cast television is the most heavily regulated communications medium.2"
The extent of allowable regulations of cable television, which is part com-
mon carrier, part newspaper, and part broadcaster, was not definitively
determined until Turner Broadcasting.2°'
198. Id. at 2451.
Broadcast stations radiate electromagnetic signals from a central transmitting an-
tenna. These signals can be captured ... by any television set within the an-
tenna's range. Cable systems ... rely upon a physical, point-to-point connection
between a transmission facility and the television sets of individual subscribers.
Cable systems make this connection ... using cable or optical fibers.
Id. Cable technology affords a benefit over broadcast television: it eliminates the interfer-
ence that is sometimes seen in broadcast television programming, and cable systems are
capable of transmitting many more channels than are available through broadcast televi-
sion. Id. at 2452. This second reason, enormous channel capacity, is the principle reason
why cable television cannot be regulated as heavily as broadcast television. See id.; supra
notes 72-87 and accompanying text (explaining the scarcity rationale justifying extensive
broadcast regulations).
199. One major difference is that the cable industry encompasses both cable program-
mers, who produce and sell programs, and cable operators, who actually transmit the pro-
grams. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452. Most of the cable operator's programs are
drawn from outside sources, which include broadcast stations and cable networks such as
CNN, C-SPAN, MTV, ESPN, and TNT. Id. Cable systems, therefore, function primarily
to transmit the speech of others. Id.; see also Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the
Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L. J. 329, 339 (noting that cable systems do not con-
duct substantive review of material provided by cable networks).
Another major distinction is that while, broadcasters generate revenue through advertis-
ing, cable systems charge viewers a monthly subscriber's fee, and rely less on advertising
revenues. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
In addition, cable subscribers choose from "tiers" of services. Id. The basic tier usually
consists of several broadcast stations and certain cable networks. Id. For additional fees,
cable operators will provide specialty channels such as HBO, pay-per-view sports and mov-
ies programming. Id.; see also JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION §§ 5.05-06, at 5-37 to 5-45 (1993) (dis-
cussing "tiers" and "buy-through" requirements, as well as, the future for video services);
Brenner, supra at 334 n. 22 (discussing pay-per-view services).
200. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that "of
all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection"); see also supra notes 72-99 and accompanying text (explaining
the rationales for extensive broadcast regulations); cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.l (1984) (noting that the scarcity rationale has come under criti-
cism in recent years due to the emergence of cable and satellite television, but refusing to
reconsider the approach until Congress or the FCC indicates that "technological develop-
ments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may
be required").
201. See Lutzker, supra note 17, at 482.
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Since deregulation of the cable industry in 1984, cable television has
grown immensely.2 °2 Congressional findings concluded that this enor-
mous growth has occurred at the expense of broadcast television. 0 3
Through this legislation generally, and the must-carry requirements and
retransmission consent provisions specifically, Congress was seeking to
level the playing field between two competing industries, one of which
has an inherent advantage over the other.20 4 Congressional intent, there-
fore, was to rescue the broadcast industry itself, and not to promote spe-
cific types of programming it believed to be inherently valuable.
C. Insufficient Justification for the Must-Carry Regulations
Currently, there is a trend toward greater regulation in the cable televi-
sion industry.205 Congress' initial purpose for instituting the must-carry
provisions was to save the broadcast industry.206 The 1992 Cable Act was
passed in the midst of an economic recession that impacted the broadcast
industry particularly hard.20 7 Any prediction of the death of the net-
works,208 however, was premature, as just two years later broadcast tele-
vision is "in the midst of a revival. '' 20 9 Consequently, the underlying
202. 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) (Supp. V 1994). As a result of deregulation in 1984, Con-
gress found that "over 60% of the households with televisions subscribe to cable television,
and this percentage is almost certain to increase." Id.
203. Id. §§ 521(a)(13), (14) and (16). Congress' findings included:
As a result of the growth of cable television, there has been a marked shift in
market share from broadcast television to cable television services . . . . Cable
television systems and broadcast television stations increasingly compete for tele-
vision advertising revenues. As the proportion of households subscribing to cable
television increases, proportionately more advertising revenues will be reallo-
cated from broadcast to cable television systems .... As a result of the economic
incentive that cable systems have to delete, reposition, or not carry local broad-
cast signals, coupled with the absence of a requirement that such systems carry
local broadcast signals, the economic viability of free local broadcast television
and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
jeopardized.
Id.
204. See supra note 4 (detailing the legislative debate surrounding the 1992 Cable Act).
205. Compare supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 Cable
Act which deregulated the cable industry) with supra notes 145-64 (discussing the 1992
Cable Act which re-regulated the industry).
206. See supra notes 123-44 and accompanying text (detailing the history and the pur-
poses of the must-carry regulations).
207. See Paul Farhi, Advertisers, Suitors Zoom in On TV Networks, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 1994, at Al.
208. See id Robert Igler, President of ABC, predicted that the "future would hold
'fewer networks.'" Id.
209. Id. The resurgence of the broadcasting industry can be partly attributed to an
improving economy. Id. at A10. The improving economy has increased the demand for
network advertising; therefore, the networks have been able to increase what they charge
650 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:615
premise for the must-carry regulations is no longer valid. Without the
economic justification for the regulations, their effect is simply to favor
television broadcasters over cable operators based on the content of the
programming. Therefore, an analysis of these regulations under a strict
scrutiny standard is wholly justified."' 0 Under this analysis, the must-
carry regulations would be presumptively unconstitutional unless they
serve a "compelling" governmental interest and are "narrowly tailored"
to serve that interest.211 The regulations were designed to provide eco-
nomic protection to the broadcast industry, an end which the Court char-
acterized as "important" but not "compelling., 21 2  Furthermore, the
regulations are not narrowly tailored to protect exclusively broadcast sta-
tions that are in economic peril, but in fact have an impact on all stations
equally regardless of their economic situation.213 Therefore, under the
appropriate First Amendment analysis, the must-carry regulations con-
tained in the 1992 Cable Act are unconstitutional.
advertisers. Id. Furthermore, due to the recession, network executives have trimmed costs
and have learned how to operate their networks on a smaller budget. Id.
This recovery may also be attributed to the unique, dominant position of network televi-
sion. Id. "No other medium can reach virtually every household every night of the week
.... No other media can spend as much as the networks on programming because no other
media reaches so many people .... In short, the networks' dominant position has an al-
most self-perpetuating quality." Id. Cable television and home video took viewers away
from the networks in the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the migration away from net-
work television has stabilized. Id. Therefore, due to the preferred position of the broad-
casting industry in particular, and the stabilizing of the communications market in general,
broadcast television is not in serious economic peril as was originally believed. See id.
Other evidence also points to the continued survival of network broadcast television. Id.
For example, broadcast television is, and is likely to remain, the only free, mass market
communications medium. Id. Also, cable companies are starting their own networks as
well, such as Paramount Communications and Time Warner. Id. at All.
210. For the view that they are content-based regulations that favor a preferred group,
see Lutzker, supra note 17, at 496-97 (arguing that "[m]ust-carry regulations create a fa-
vored class of speakers based on the local content of their speech," and, therefore, should
be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis).
211. See supra notes 21-22 (outlining the strict scrutiny analysis used by the courts and
comparing it to a lesser, intermediate level of scrutiny standard).
212. National Ass'n. of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The Court recognized the "importance of local programming to a national broadcasting
system that is designed to serve the public interest." Id. at 1198.
213. See generally Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. at 2445, 2479-80
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing from the dissent's
point of view that the must-carry regulations are overly broad under both the strict scrutiny
analysis and the intermediate scrutiny analysis).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Presented with a case of first impression, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC214 that cable access re-
quirements in the 1992 Cable Act were entitled to an intermediate level
of First Amendment scrutiny. 15 The Court concluded that these regula-
tions were economic provisions designed to promote competition within
the video industry and to protect a broadcast industry that appeared to be
in peril. 16 If Congress discerns a need to promote competition and to
correct market imbalances within the video industry by implementing in-
terventionist legislation, the future will see additional cable regulations
designed to constrain the ever-expanding cable television industry. 17
This would be unfortunate, however, as the market has demonstrated its
own ability to correct economic imbalances without congressional
assistance. 18
Toni Elizabeth Gilbert
214. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
215. See id. at 2469.
216. Id. at 2469-70.
217. Congress has promulgated legislation deregulating and regulating cable television
largely in reaction to market conditions. Compare supra notes 103-06 and accompanying
text (discussing the deregulation the cable television industry, pursuant to the 1984 Cable
Act, to promote the growth of the industry) with supra notes 145-64 (discussing the re-
regulation of the expanding cable television industry, pursuant to the 1992 Cable Act, in
part to promgte competition in the communications industry as a whole and to protect the
broadcast industry).
218. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (detailing the resurgence of the
broadcast industry).

